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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, I present a non standard objection to moral impartialism. My idea is that moral
impartialism is questionable when it is committed to a principle we have reasons to reject: the
principle of self-other symmetry. According to the utilitarian version of the principle, the benefits
and harms to the agent are exactly as relevant to the global evaluation of the goodness of his
action as the benefits and harms to any other agent. But this view sits badly with the “Harm
principle” which stresses the difference between harm to others and harm to the self. According
to the deontological version, we have moral duties to ourselves which are exactly symmetrical
to our duties to others. But there are reasons to believe that the idea of a duty to the self is not
coherent.
RÉSUMÉ
Dans cet article, je présente une objection non standard à l’impartialisme moral. Ma thèse est
que l’impartialisme est douteux lorsqu’il admet un principe que nous avons des raisons de reje-
ter: le principe de la symétrie soi-autre. Selon la version utilitariste de ce principe, les bienfaits et
les torts faits à l’agent sont d’exactement la même importance à l’évaluation globale du bien
d’une action que les bienfaits ou les torts faits à tout autre agent. Mais cette théorie s’harmo-
nise mal avec le « principe de non-nuisance » qui insiste sur la différence entre un tort fait à
autrui et à soi-même. Selon la version déontologique, nous avons des devoirs moraux envers nous-
mêmes exactement symétriques à nos devoirs envers autrui. Mais il y a des raisons de croire que
l’idée d’un devoir envers soi-même n’est pas cohérente.
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Many philosophers deny that impartiality could be all there is to
ethics.  According to them, a morality limited to impartiality would
be unrealistic, globally irrelevant to our lives and even repugnant in
some cases. 
I present another kind of objection to moral impartiality, less
melodramatic if I may say. My idea is that moral impartiality is ques-
tionable when it is committed to a principle we have reasons to reject:
the principle of self-other symmetry. 
But what is self-other symmetry?
SELF-OTHER SYMMETRY 
Self-other symmetry is a basic commitment in many moral theories,
but it takes different forms depending on the global structure of the
theory. 
One could say, for example, that utilitarian theories are based
on self-other symmetry because, according to theses theories, the
benefits and harms to the agent are exactly as relevant to the global
evaluation of the goodness of his action as the benefits and harms
to any other agent 1. And one could say that deontological theories
of Kantian flavour are based on self-other symmetry because, accor-
ding to them, we have moral duties to ourselves, which are exactly
symmetrical to our duties to others.  The famous second main for-
mulation of the categorical imperative, in the Groundwork of the
Metaphysics of Morals, also called the “Formula of Humanity”, stres-
ses this symmetry as explicitly as possible: 
Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in
your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as
a means but always at the same time as an end2. 
The clause “whether in your own person or in the person of any
other” is a non-equivocal affirmation of self-other moral symmetry.
Suicide or masturbation are “moral crimes” according to Kant, partly
because of their supposed moral symmetry with killing and sexual
abuse. 
Finally, one could even say that virtue ethics is based on self-
other symmetry because it values equally care to others and self-care.
Actually, this is Michael Slote’s master argument in favour of virtue
ethics3, and it raises a perplexity concerning the scope of my criti-
cism of self-other symmetry. 
SOME PERPLEXITIES
If virtue ethics is committed to self-other symmetry, as Michael Slote
claims, and if virtue ethics does not belong to the class of impartia-
list moral theories, as some moral philosophers would probably say,
then by objecting to self-other symmetry, the target could be larger
than moral impartialism. It could include virtue ethics as well, or
some versions of it at least. It could make my argument less limited
than I have suggested. But there are other perplexities.   
Self-other symmetry seems to be a very important feature of
many moral theories, but, at the same time, one can find elements of
self-other asymmetry in these theories. Think of the “Harm principle”
put forward by John Stuart Mill. According to Mill:  “The only part
of the conduct of anyone which he is amenable to society is that which
concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his inde-
pendence is of right absolute. Over himself, over his own body and
mind, the individual is sovereign”4. In more concrete words, according
to the Harm principle, one can be morally or legally permitted to do
to oneself what one is not permitted morally or legally to do to others,
the most striking example being, again, suicide as opposed to killing.
The “Harm principle”, as a kind of self-other asymmetry, goes against
the utilitarian general commitment to self-other symmetry. 
One could have expected that Mill, being a prominent representative
of utilitarianism, would also be a prominent supporter of self-other
symmetry. But for him, the harms to the agent are not as relevant to
the global evaluation of the goodness of his action as the harms to
any other agent.  So, he is not a supporter of self-other symmetry
after all.  
According to Michael Slote, Kant is also guilty of inconsis-
tency in his treatment of self-other symmetry5. On the one hand, Kant
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claims that we should apply to ourselves exactly the same moral rules
we apply to any other person. He argues not only for the wrongness
or impermissibility of killing others but for the wrongness or imper-
missibility of suicide as well. And this is clearly a commitment to
self-other symmetry.  
But for Michael Slote, this view sits badly with what Kant
says about the absence of duties to pursue one’s own happiness 6. For
Kant, the concept of duty applies only in case we are reluctant to do
something. It does not apply when we do something inevitably and
spontaneously. Now, if it is true that we tend naturally to care about
our own interests and that we tend, as naturally, to neglect the inte-
rests of other people, then, in Kant’s perspective, there should be no
duties to further one’s own interests but only duties to further the
interests of other people. The fact that some of us may have a ten-
dency to ruin themselves through stupidity, carelessness, laziness does
not weaken the argument. Personal imprudence leads to its own natu-
ral punishment, while ill treatment of others does not come with its
own natural punishment, except in fairy tales. If ill treatment of others
it is to be controlled, it can only be through a sort of socialised sys-
tem of duties and punishment. 
According to Michael Slote, there is a contradiction in Kant’s
views about morality between his claim that we should apply to our-
selves exactly the same rules we apply to any other person, and his
other claim that there are no duties to further one’s own interests but
only duties to further the interests of other people. In other words,
he supports both self-other symmetry and self-other asymmetry, and
this is not coherent.  
One could add that the disharmony is even bigger when we
introduce degrees of closeness to ourselves in the picture. We tend
naturally to care not only about our own interests, but about the inte-
rests of those who are dear and near to us. And if we have a natu-
ral tendency to further the interests of those who are near or dear to
us, then strictly speaking, there could be no duty to further their inte-
rests. 
If Kant’s logic in this domain were followed, we could have
moral duties only towards those we dislike or those who are perso-
nally the most distant from us. So there is an element of moral asym-
metry in Kant’s moral system after all.  
Actually, I will not enter into these difficulties. I am not espe-
cially interested in testing the coherence of Mill’s utilitarianism, of
Kant’s moral system or of Slote’s version of virtue ethics. I just want
to present reasons to reject some forms of self-other symmetry and
other reasons to endorse some forms of self-other asymmetry. 
FORMS OF SELF-OTHER ASYMMETRY 
Self-other asymmetry expresses itself in different ways. The most
well-known are 
1. selfishness, which gives priority to the agent’s own interests
over the interests of other people;
2. selective altruism, which gives priority to the interests of
those who are near and dear to the agent over the interests
of the agent himself and the interests of those who are not
near and dear to him; 
3. radical altruism, which gives priority to the interests of
every other person over the interests of the agent himself. 
But I will only defend self-other asymmetry when it takes the
form of the harm principle according to which harm to self is morally
indifferent. I will try to show that there is no good reason to turn
away from common-sense moral thinking on this specific point. 
Whenever philosophers have tried to abandon this form of common-
sense self-other asymmetry, whenever they have tried to line up the
harm we do to ourselves with the harm we do to others, they ended
up with what I take to be unsound concepts like “duties to oneself ”
or “self-regarding moral virtues”, if not with absurd questions like
“Is it possible for me to rescue myself?” or “Is it possible for me to
compensate myself?” or “Is it possible for me to be grateful to
myself ?”7. At least, this is what I will try to show. 
My plan will be the following.
First I will present the Harm principle as a form of self-other
asymmetry grounded in common-sense moral thinking. Then I will
examine and reject an argument to the effect that self-other asymme-
try is not grounded in common-sense moral thinking but in the theo-
retical importance of consent. Finally, I will try to show how wrong
one can go when one departs from common-sense views about self-
other asymmetry, by presenting Kant’s arguments regarding “duties
to the self ” as they are called. 
WHAT IS “COMMON-SENSE MORAL THINKING”? 
A few words should be said at this point about what I mean by “com-
mon-sense moral thinking”. I am not referring to empirical sociolo-
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gical or psychological data about everyday moral judgements of dif-
ferent people from different countries and different backgrounds.
Actually, I could have referred to data of this kind, because we have
now an interesting body of knowledge about everyday moral judg-
ments, thanks to the works of psychologists Jean Piaget, Lawrence
Kohlberg, Carol Gilligan, Jonathan Haidt, Larry Nucci or Elliott Turiel
among many others8.  
But when I refer to “common-sense moral thinking” I am
pointing to something less empirical. I am concerned with formal or
substantial norms of moral thinking which are not always openly
expressed in everyday judgements. What I have in mind are norms
like “You should treat like cases alike”, “You should not sacrifice
innocents”, etc. These norms are formulated by philosophers and pre-
sented as central or basic “moral intuitions”. They are sometimes rhe-
torically attributed to everyone, whether real people have them or not.
What is philosophically special about them is that they are supposed
to be moral assertions which need no further justification and to be
valid objections to some big theories in ethics. Think of our suppo-
sed “intuition” that we should not sacrifice one innocent person even
in order to save the lives of thousands of innocents, which is so often
directed against some versions of utilitarianism. 
IMPARTIALITY AND PARTIALITY IN ETHICS 
The debate around impartiality and partiality in ethics has many dif-
ferent aspects and meanings. It may oppose philosophers who believe
that, as far as morality is concerned, we should, a priori, have the
same benevolent attitude toward every human being, from the nea-
rest and dearest to the distant other, and philosophers who believe
that it is morally permitted or even admirable to give some priority,
systemically or in certain specific circumstances, to yourself, your
friends, relatives, compatriots, etc., out of love, friendship, loyalty,
quest for self perfection. In this context, we are offered two possibi-
lities.
1. Impartiality
I should have the same benevolent attitude toward every human being,
myself included. 
2. Partiality
I am permitted to give some priority, systemically or in certain speci-
fic circumstances, to myself, my friends, relatives, fellow countrymen. 
But if we take into account the Harm principle as well, moral par-
tiality itself should be divided in two classes: positive partiality based
on benefits to ourselves and those who are near to us, and negative
partiality which means that we are permitted to harm ourselves but
not other persons 
In other words, we have three possibilities and not only two,
the first involving self-other symmetry and the two others involving
self-other asymmetry.
1. Impartiality
I should have the same benevolent attitude toward everyone, myself
included. 
2. Positive partiality
I am permitted to treat myself, my friends, my relatives, my fellow
countrymen better than other people, systemically or in certain spe-
cific circumstances.   
3. Negative partiality
I am permitted to harm intentionally myself but not other persons. 
If we dig deeper, we find other possibilities: 
4. misanthropy: it is a kind of impartiality which consists in
having the same malevolent attitude toward everyone, myself inclu-
ded. The problem is of course that such form of impartiality could
hardly be called “moral”. 
5. self-hatred: it is a kind of negative partiality which consists
in treating myself, my friends, my relatives, my fellow countrymen
worse than other people. Blacks, Jews, and other representatives of
minorities are sometimes claimed to exhibit this attitude. The ques-
tion is again if such a form of negative partiality could be called
“moral”.
6. self-sacrifice: here we have a “supermoral” or “supereroga-
tory” negative partiality which consists in a complete ban on self-
benefits .
I will insist on negative partiality, especially on this specific
kind which permits harm to self but not to others.
MORAL ASYMMETRY IN COMMON-SENSE 
MORAL THINKING
Actually, I have borrowed the words “self-other symmetry” and “self-
other asymmetry” from Michael Slote9. Sometimes, he uses the words
“moral symmetry” instead of “self-other symmetry” and “moral asym-
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metry” instead “self-other asymmetry”. For him, these expressions
have the same meaning. I will follow him on this account as well. 
What he calls either “self-other symmetry” or “moral symmetry” is
a system that brings together care to others and something like self-
care or reasonable selfishness. 
What he calls “common-sense moral asymmetry” has two
aspects. It consists in self-abnegation or self-sacrifice, that is, in avoi-
ding some personal benefits where we would not prevent another per-
son from receiving the same benefit. But it consists also in permit-
ting to harm ourselves where we would not be permitted to harm
another person in a similar way10. When he comes to examine moral
theories according to these standards he insists on the first aspect of
common-sense moral asymmetry, that is, on self-abnegation or self-
sacrifice. He thinks that common-sense and Kantian morality value
only self-abnegation or self-sacrifice while utilitarianism and virtue
ethics value equally care to others and self-care or reasonable sel-
fishness. He claims that “the common avoidance of self-other asym-
metry allows utilitarianism and virtue ethics to go forward securely
in a manner that is not possible for either Kantianism or common-
sense morality”11. 
I have difficulties with both the classification and the conclu-
sions.
First, it seems to me that through the second main formula-
tion of the categorical imperative, Kantian moral system is so deep-
ly committed to self-other moral symmetry that it is not very fruit-
ful to insist on some elements of self-other moral asymmetry we can
find in it12.
Second, although Mill’s is utilitarian, this doesn’t prevent him
from proposing a Harm principle, which is clearly asymmetric,. 
And third, I think that Michael Slote should have treated in a com-
pletely different manner the two aspects of what he calls “common-
sense moral asymmetry”. 
“Common-sense moral asymmetry” consists in avoiding some
personal benefits where we would not prevent another person from
receiving the same benefit, as well as in permitting to harm oursel-
ves where we would not be permitted to harm another person in a
similar way. 
One can say that there can be something “moral” in avoiding
personal benefits where we would not prevent another person from
receiving the same benefit. But can one say, in a similar manner, that
there can be something moral in permitting to harm ourselves where
we would not be permitted to harm another person in a similar way?
I don’t think so. This second kind of asymmetry tells us something
interesting about the limits we set to what can be called “moral” or
“immoral”. It seems to fall outside the scope of morality altogether.
Let me present some examples. 
Suppose that instead of cutting his own ear, Van Gogh had jumped
on some innocent passer-by to cut the ear of this unfortunate fellow.
It seems natural to me to say that common-sense moral thinking would
treat these two cases differently. The harm done by Van Gogh to him-
self could only be called crazy, irrational but not immoral, while the
harm done to the innocent passer-by could be called immoral as well.
Now, let’s compare the following statements.
1. You should read or practise some sport instead of spending
all your days on the couch, watching stupid programs on television
and stuffing yourself with chocolate cookies. I don’t force you, I don’t
threaten you. I just tell you that it would be better for you. 
2. You should read or practise some sport instead of spending
all your days on the couch, watching stupid programs on television
and stuffing yourself with chocolate cookies. I don’t force you, I don’t
threaten you. I just tell you that so staying in front of the television
would be immoral. 
3. According to many witnesses, you have spent more than 30
days on a couch, watching stupid programs on television and stuf-
fing yourself with chocolate cookies. By so acting, you have viola-
ted the law criminalizing unhealthy behaviour. You are fined 100 000
dollars and from now on, you will be under medical supervision at
your own expenses. 
Let’s concentrate on the second statement. It seems to me that
there is something queer, if I may say, in asserting “It is immoral to
spend all your days on the couch, watching stupid programs on tele-
vision and stuffing yourself with chocolate cookies” because it
consists in blaming a person for harming himself or herself, and har-
ming oneself is morally indifferent. 
In order to prove that what’s wrong with this judgement is
that it concerns only harm to self, it could be sufficient to show that
if it were formulated a little differently, with a hint to the fact that
such behaviour would also harm, even indirectly, some other person,
it would not seem queer at all. For example, the judgement “It is
immoral to stuff yourself with chocolate cookies when you could save
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so many lives by sharing them with hungry little children”, wouldn’t
seem queer, I believe, but it is, of course, because it directly implies
other persons. 
So much for the idea that the self-other asymmetry is plausi-
bly grounded in our common-sense moral thinking, as a sort of intui-
tion which does not require justification. 
Some philosophers have tried to ground self-other asymmetry
in something “deeper”, more “philosophical”. They have tried to show
that self-other asymmetry could be derivative from the moral impor-
tance of consent. Could it be the case? 
GROUNDING COMMON-SENSE MORAL ASYMMETRY
In a footnote attached to his “Some Advantages of Virtue Ethics”,
Michael Slote writes that it has been suggested to him that the rea-
son why we are allowed to harm ourselves where we would not be
permitted to harm others in a similar way lies in the consent impli-
cit in whatever we do to ourselves. If I harm myself I presumably
do it willingly, whereas the agent I am harming does not consent to
the harm13. 
According to this explanation, the self-other asymmetry is not
a substantial feature of common-sense morality but derivative from
the moral importance of consent. Shelly Kagan has also observed that
a defence of moral asymmetry could be grounded in the moral impor-
tance of consent. He writes that if what is in question is “only my
treatment of myself, it is obvious that I will always be acting with
the consent of the person I am affecting”14. But in what sense does
consent affect my action? Well in case of harm, it does in a very
special way. According to Kagan, normally, it is not permissible to
perform an act if it would involve harming someone. There is a
constraint against acting so. But when I deliberately harm myself, I
have my own permission to do so. And for that reason, I am remo-
ved from the scope of the constraint15. The argument would be clea-
rer if it were put in legal terms. We should make a difference bet-
ween causing physical or psychological pain to someone as it may
happen in medical procedures or in violent sports like ice hockey or
boxing, that is with some sort of consent of the victim to the risks
of being injured, and causing to someone some physical or psycho-
logical pain to which he has never consented in any sense. In both
cases some pain has been caused but it is only in the second case,
that is, where there was no consent, that one can speak of rights vio-
lations, torts, or harm in the moral sense. The common law doctrine
“Volenti non fit injuria” means “one cannot be wronged by that to
which one consents”. It could be interpreted in the following way, I
think. When there is tacit or explicit consent, there might be pain but
no harm, no violation of rights, no wrong. The same could be said
for harm to self. You can intentionally cause pain to yourself but you
can’t harm yourself intentionally, because where there is consent, there
is no harm, in the sense of there being no wrong. 
Shelly Kagan thinks that the argument can obviously be resisted by
those who deny the moral relevance of consent, and also, but less
obviously, by those who do accept the relevance of consent but deny
that in cases like those supposed to illustrate harm to self, true consent
obtains.  
When someone is about to commit suicide or self-mutilation
can we say that he is really acting willingly? Can we say that he is
really consenting?
I think that we don’t have to enter into these psychological
and conceptual complexities because there is a better argument against
grounding self-other asymmetry in consent. It has been proposed by
Michael Slote, actually. According to him, common-sense morality
makes a difference between negligently causing harm to another per-
son and negligently causing harm to oneself. We keep making a dif-
ference between harm to self and harm to others even when the harm
was not done intentionally or when there was no consent to the harm
done. And this should bring us to think, in the most simple way, that
after all, self-other asymmetry is not grounded in intention or consent. 
I think that Michael Slote is right and that self-other asym-
metry is not derivative from the moral importance of consent, nor
reducible to it16. It should be taken as a basic moral intuition which
can be used against traditional impartialist moral theories. 
Until now I have presented some arguments to the effect that
self-other asymmetry is a reasonable feature of common-sense moral
thinking and need not be grounded in the moral importance of consent. 
Now, I will try to show how wrong one can go when one departs
from this common-sense view about self-other asymmetry. I will pre-
sent to this effect Kant’s views on “duties to the self ” or “duties to
oneself ” as they are more often called. 
WHAT’S WRONG WITH KANT’S ARGUMENT FOR 
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MORAL SYMMETRY
Kant “duties to self ” are divided into perfect duties which concern
us as natural beings and perfect duties which concern us as moral
beings. Examples of perfect duties which concern us as natural beings
are prohibitions on suicide, on masturbation and on excessive use of
food and drink. Examples of perfect duties which concern us as moral
beings are prohibitions on lying, avarice and servility. We have also
imperfect duties not to leave our natural talents or capacities idle and,
as it were, rusting away. All these duties to ourselves are presented
as duties not to downgrade ourselves by denying our own humanity.
They are duties not to harm ourselves. This is why I am especially
interested in them.
It has been recently noticed that, despite Kant’s claim that
duties to oneself are of primary importance in his system, his idea
has not been widely discussed17. Actually, after Marcus Singer publi-
shed a short and brilliant paper on duties to oneself in 1959, there
has been an intense exchange of arguments on the subject18. But it
didn’t last, and I don’t know why. The only thing I can say is that it
is not due to the fact that Singer’s replies were so good that nothing
could be added to them. Nothing of that sort has ever happened in
philosophy, especially in moral philosophy, and it would be almost
supernatural that it had happened then! 
I am personally very interested in this issue because I am
trying to build a sort of “minimalist ethics” in which there are no
duties to self and no self- regarding virtues. I will return to this very
shortly in my conclusion.
But before that, I will present what I take to be the best argu-
ment against duties to the self as Kant conceived of them. 
It aims to show that the notion of duty to the self is contradictory. 
Other arguments could have being raised as well. For example:
1. Duties to the self are not really duties toward the self as a
particular person but duties toward abstract entities like nature or the
human species. When, for example, Kant argues against masturbation,
it is partly because according to him human species would disappear if
it were a unique and universal sexual practice. So Kant’s ban on mas-
turbation is less a duty to oneself than a duty to the human species. 
2. As moral duties, duties to the self are only derivative from
duties toward other people. I may have a moral duty to keep fit, if
for example it may help me care about other people: my lover, family,
children, fellow citizens, etc. Another example: I may have a moral
duty to stay sober if I am the pilot of the airplane, but it is a moral
duty to the passengers more than to myself. 
3. Duties to the self are not real duties but natural preferen-
ces. There can be no moral prohibition to ruin your own talents
because no normal human being wants to ruin his own talents. 
I insist on the formal argument because if duties to the self
are inconceivable, we will naturally turn to these other arguments
which are meant to show that talk about duties to the self is always
talk about something else, something more conceivable, if not more
acceptable. 
The fact is that it has often been noticed that the notion of
duties to oneself is conceptually problematic in a way that the notion
of duties to others is not. 
There are duties which can clearly be regarded as relative to
other persons: duties arising from contracts, agreements, debts or pro-
mises for example, but duties to oneself do not seem to be that clearly
conceivable. Why?
Against Kant who claimed that our duties to ourselves are of
primary importance and should have pride of place and who added
that the prior condition of our duties to others is our duties to our-
selves19, Marcus Singer has argued, for example, that it is “actually
impossible for there to be any duties to oneself in any literal sense
because, if taken literally the idea involves a contradiction” 20. 
His argument goes like this. If in general “A has a duty to B,
then B has a right against or with respect to A. But it follows from
this that to have a duty to oneself would be to have a right against
oneself and this is surely nonsense. What could it mean to have a
right or a claim against oneself? (Could one sue oneself in a court
of law for return of the money one owes to oneself)?”21
Singer is right to stress the absurdity of these implications of
the idea that one can have a duty to himself. But here, there is no
obvious contradiction, just some kind of category mistake. The contra-
dictory character of duties to self is more obvious when we consider
the structure of promises or debts. 
As a duty to another person a promise has the following fea-
tures. Suppose you have promised to lend me your vacuum cleaner.
You can, of course, break this promise, by hiding yourself, destroying
the vacuum cleaner, or even by telling me that you have simply chan-
ged your mind: you realised that you don’t like me after all and that
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you don’t want to lend me anything anymore. 
But none of this will release you from your specific promise
or cancel it. It will just be a promise which you have not kept. Actually
you can’t be released from your promise by yourself. However, you
can be released from it by me, that is, by the one to whom you made
it. I can cancel your promise because, for example, I realised that I
am too lazy to vacuum my place, or because I realised that I don’t
like you after all and I don’t want to feel I owe something or for
whatever other stupid reason. 
In short, the person who promised something cannot release
himself from the promise, but the person to whom the promise has
been made can release from his promise the person who promised.
Now suppose that it is the same person who made the promise and
to whom the promise has been made.
He is not bound by his promise and he is bound by it. He can
release his promise and he can’t. Isn’t it contradictory? 
When we move from promises to debts, the contradiction is as obvious
when it is the same person who is creditor and debtor. Suppose you
lent me 20 000 dollars. I am under the obligation to return them to
you. Of course you are free to tell me in a fit of generosity or vanity:
“I decided to cancel your debt. You don’t owe me 20 000 dollars any-
more”. But I am not free to answer. “Well, it doesn’t matter. I didn’t
plan to return them to you. In the meanwhile, I had cancelled my debt.”  
So the creditor is free to release the debtor from his obliga-
tion, but the debtor isn’t free to release himself from the obligation. 
Now, suppose that it is the same person who is creditor and debtor.
He is free to release himself from the debt ant not free to release
himself from the debt. Isn’t it contradictory? 
One could deny that the model of the contract or the promise
is relevant when we deal with duties to oneself. One may think that
duties to the self belong to the category of duties you can’t be relea-
sed from, like duties not to torture or duties not to enslave22. But
could all duties to the self be seen that way? I doubt it. An argu-
ment is obviously missing here. 
In any case, although Kant claimed that “our duties to our-
selves are of primary importance and should have pride of place” and
added that “the prior condition of our duties to others is our duties
to ourselves”, he was quite aware that duties to oneself involve, at
first sight at least, a contradiction. 
In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant insists on the foundatio-
nal role of duties to oneself. He presents them as precondition of all
obligation to others as well23. But at the beginning of the section
where he develops this point, he mentions a puzzle about the possi-
bility of duties to the self24: does the self not have to be active and
passive at the same time, which is impossible? If the “one imposing
obligation and the one put under obligation were identical, could not
the former always release the latter -we ourselves- from an obliga-
tion?”. Wouldn’t it involve a contradiction? 
For Kant the contradiction is only apparent, because actually
it is not the ordinary or phenomenal self, that is, the one governed
by the laws of nature, who is placing himself under the obligation,
but what he calls the noumenal self, the one that is endowed with
inner freedom. It is only qua noumenal self that one can freely place
oneself under an obligation. But as fantastic as the powers of the nou-
menal self might be, it is hard to see how they may allow him to
have a duty to himself, if it is a contradictory notion. It might be
that it is in order to block this objection that Kant appeals to a totally
different argument. “For suppose there were no duties to oneself; then
there would be no duties whatsoever, not even external duties”25. 
At first sight, Kant tries here to make use of his notion of
autonomy, that is the idea that we can freely give a law to ourselves,
in order to show that duties to the self are conceivable26. But, as it
has been noticed, “it would be surprising if the notion of autonomy
and the notion of duty to oneself turned out to be identical”27. 
In Kant’s eyes, the idea that we can freely give a law to our-
selves may ground moral duties to others as well as duties to the self.
But from this it does not seem to follow that, for him, there is no
difference between duties to others and duties to the self, or that the
idea of autonomous lawgiving is identical with the idea of duty to
the self. 
In any case, it has been suggested that we should take Kant’s reaso-
ning here as a reductio ad absurdum and read it: “If they were no
duties to the self, there would not be duties at all. But there are duties,
therefore there are duties to the self ”28. 
Marcus Singer calls this argument a blatant “non sequitur”. I
agree. It seems to me that we would still have external duties, that
is, duties to others, even if we had no duties to ourselves. It might
be that if we had no duties to ourselves, we could not fulfil our duties
to others, but this is a totally different story. And even this story
doesn’t seem promising. After all, what we need in order to fulfil our
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duties to others is not to be able to respect our duties to ourselves
but to have the motivation or the will to fulfil our duties to others. 
A number of other arguments have been raised against the idea of
duty to the self. Bernard Williams, for example, claims that there is
nothing more in the notion of duty to the self than the idea of self-
interest. For him, using the word “duty” is just a fraudulent and per-
nicious way of speaking of self-interest29. It could be a perfect exam-
ple of the fallacies of modern moral philosophy. But of course, by
mocking duties to the self, Williams is not at all pleading for some
kind of self-other asymmetry. As a supporter of Ancient ethics, he
will not deny that self-care has an ethical importance.
I myself take the argument against duties to the self as a first
step in a defence of common sense moral asymmetry, as it is expres-
sed by the harm principle. The second step could be a criticism or
self-regarding moral virtues like temperance or endurance. But I leave
it for another occasion. 
CONCLUSION 
Instead of presenting as a conclusion what I have already said, I will
try to push my questions a little further. 
Could we conceive of an impartialist theory which would make room
for self-other asymmetry?30
Actually, impartialist moral outlooks could make room for self-
other asymmetry in a very simple way. The impartialist may say that
if we reason from the impartial point of view, we will be brought to
the conclusion that harm to self is morally indifferent. 
But why would we be brought to this conclusion? The claim would
need further justification and it is not sure that it could be given.
Another way to reconcile impartiality and self-other asymmetry seems
to be more promising. 
It consists in specifying first what can be called the “scope
of morality”. In this area, I would separate “maximalists” and “mini-
malists”31. I call “maximalists” those who give the largest scope to
morality. They include in morality what we owe to ourselves, what
we owe to others and what we owe to abstract entities like the needs
of society or symbolic entities like the flag of the nation. By contrast,
for “minimalists”, the scope of morality is very narrow. It covers only
what we owe to each other as individuals.
Once the scope of morality is fixed, our moral concepts apply
in this limited area only. 
For a maximalist, moral impartiality will apply to everyone,
myself included and to many other things as well. A maximalist won’t
be able to be committed to common-sense self-other asymmetry and
an impartialist at the same time. If he is an impartialist, he will have
to deny common-sense self-other asymmetry. 
For a minimalist, moral impartiality will apply only to our
relations to other people. A minimalist will be able to be, at the same
time, an impartialist in his relations to others and to be committed
to common-sense self-other asymmetry. 
I think this is a good point for moral minimalism. 
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12 As Slote himself admits, Ibid., p. 47. 
13 Ibid.,, p. 19. 
14 Kagan, Normative Ethics, p. 147.
15 Ibid., p. 147-148.  
16 Christine Tappolet has suggested to me that we could see moral asymmetry
as a substantial feature of commonsense morality and as derivative from
the moral importance of consent. I am not sure I could agree, precisely
because I think that Slote is right when he claims that negligent self-harm
has a different moral status than negligent harm to others. Of course, one
could try to deny that negligent self-harm has a different moral status.
Still, it seems to me that we could all agree, at least, that we are morally
more demanding when it comes to harm to others: negligent harm to
others will not be as easily excused as negligent harm to self. 
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19 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals p. 543-544.
20 Singer, “On Duties To Oneself ”, p. 202.
21 Ibid.
22 Another very good point made by Christine Tappolet can be related to this.
She thinks that we might conceive of duties to the self neither as promises
one can freely release oneself from nor as unconditional or absolute duties
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one can never be released from, but as duties grounded on the value of,
say, avoiding suffering. But then we would have a sort of duty not to suf-
fer. Could a duty not to suffer be properly called a “duty” or an “obliga-
tion”? Kantians would probably not agree (see note 5).
23 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals. 
24 Timmermann, “Kantian Duties to the Self, Explained and Defended”, p. 509
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28 Ibid., p. 509. 
29 Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, p.51; 181-182. 
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